Systems exploiting network coding to increase their throughput suffer greatly from pollution attacks, which consist of injecting malicious packets in the network. The pollution attacks are amplified by the network coding process, resulting in a greater damage than under traditional routing. In this paper, we address this issue by designing an unconditionally secure authentication code (that is, which does not rely on computational assumptions) suitable for multicast network coding, where the keying material is initially computed and distributed by a trusted authority to the destinations and intermediate nodes. The proposed scheme allows not only destinations, but also intermediate nodes, to verify the integrity and origin of the packets received without having to decode, and thus detect and discard the malicious messages in transit that fail the verification. This way, the pollution is canceled out before reaching the destinations. The proposed scheme is robust against pollution attacks from outsiders, as well as coalitions of malicious insider nodes, which have the ability to perform the integrity check, but instead get corrupted and use their knowledge to themselves attack the network. We analyze the performance of the scheme in terms of both throughput and goodput and show that the price to pay for tolerating inside attackers is a high decrease in throughput (it is inversely proportional to the number of insider attackers that can collude). We finally discuss applications to file distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
N ETWORK coding was first introduced in [2] as an innovative approach to characterize the rate region of multicast networks. Network coding allows intermediate nodes between the source(s) and the destinations not only to store and forward, but also to encode the received packets before forwarding them. In [17] , Li et al. showed that linear coding suffices to achieve the max-flow from the source to each receiving node in multicast networks, where intermediate nodes generate outgoing packets as linear combinations of their incoming packets. In line with [17] , [15] gave an algebraic framework for linear network One way to address the pollution attack problem is through authentication techniques. Packets in transit at the intermediate nodes should be authenticated before being encoded and forwarded to verify both their origin and their content. The goal is to achieve authentication even in the presence of both inside and outside attackers who can observe the messages flowing through the network and inject selected messages. The success of their attacks depends on their ability in sending a message that will be accepted as valid (i.e., impersonation attack) or in observing a message and then altering the message content (i.e., substitution attack) in such a way that intermediate nodes and destinations cannot detect it.
Let us recall that authentication consists of the following properties, though we will focus here only on the first two:
• Data integrity: protecting the data from any modification by malicious entities; • Data origin authentication: validating the identity of the origin of the data;
• Nonrepudiation: guaranteeing that the origin of the data cannot deny having created and sent data. To satisfy these properties, messages at the source are appended either a digital signature, a message authentication code (MAC), or an authentication code (also called tag). There exist subtle differences among these techniques. First, MAC and authentication codes ensure data integrity and data origin authentication, while digital signatures also provide nonrepudiation. Second, MACs, authentication codes, and digital signatures should be differentiated depending on what type of security they achieve: computational security (i.e., vulnerable against an attacker that has unlimited computational resources) or unconditional security (i.e., robust against an attacker that has unlimited computational resources). MACs are proven to be computationally secure, while the security of authentication codes is unconditional [21] . Digital signature schemes exist for both computational security and unconditional security. However, while computationally secure digital signatures can be verified by anyone with a public verification algorithm, the unconditionally secure digital signatures can only be verified by intended receivers as it is for MACs and authentication codes [13] .
B. Related Work
Several authentication schemes have been recently proposed in the literature to detect polluted packets at intermediate nodes [4] , [5] , [12] , [22] , [24] based on cryptographic functions with computational assumptions, detailed as follows.
The scheme in [12] for network-coded content distribution allows intermediate nodes to detect malicious packets injected in the network and to alert neighboring nodes when a malicious packet is detected. It uses a homomorphic hash function to generate hash values of the encoded blocks of data that are then sent to the intermediate nodes and destinations prior to the encoded data. The transmission of these hash values is performed over a preestablished secure channel.
The signature scheme in [5] is a homomorphic signature scheme based on Weil pairing over elliptic curves, while the one proposed in [22] is a homomorphic signature scheme based on RSA. For both schemes, intermediate nodes can authenticate the packets in transit without decoding and generate a verifiable signature of the packet that they have just encoded without knowing the signer's secret key. However, these schemes require one key pair for each file to be verified.
The signature scheme proposed in [24] uses a standard signature scheme based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. The blocks of data are considered as vectors spanning a subspace. The signature is not performed on vectors containing data blocks, but on vectors orthogonal to all data vectors in the given subspace. The signature verification allows to check if the received vector belongs to the data subspace. The security of their scheme holds in that no adversary knowing a signature on a given subspace of data vectors is able to forge a valid signature for any vector not in this given subspace. This scheme also requires fresh keys for every file.
The signature schemes given in [4] follow the approach given in [24] with improvements in terms of public key size and perpacket overhead. The signature schemes proposed are designed to authenticate a linear subspace formed by the vectors containing data blocks. Signatures on a linear subspace are sufficient to authenticate all the vectors in this same subspace. With these schemes, a single public key can be used to verify multiple files.
We note that, in parallel, results of interest have appeared in the context of network error correction [16] , [20] , where the aim is to design network codes that allow recovery from packet erasures/corruption, occurring due to the network, but also possibly to the presence of adversaries. Both works consider the network coding design. In [20] , rank-metric codes originally proposed by Gabidulin are revisited in the context of network coding, while in [16] , the authors introduce the idea of coding the information by subspaces, rather than by particular vectors in a given subspace, since linear network coding thus preserves subspaces, which gives rise to Grassmannian network codes. Both approaches, however, do not stop the pollution to propagate, which can be rephrased in terms of min-cut capacity as follows: Existing network-error-correction schemes are inherently limited by the adversarial output min-cut, while a scheme that prevents pollution to propagate may be robust to large min-cut adversaries as long as the network with the adversarial nodes removed still exhibits a large min-cut capacity.
Finally, the most recent related works have been presented in [1] , where a message authentication code has been proposed to provide integrity for network coding, and in [23] , where a scheme to secure in particular XOR network coding against pollution attacks has been given.
C. Organization and Contribution
In this paper, we propose an unconditionally secure solution that provides multicast network coding with robustness against pollution attacks. Our solution allows intermediate nodes and destinations to verify the data origin and integrity of the messages received without decoding, and thus to detect and discard the malicious messages that fail the verification. It is important to note that destinations must receive a sufficient number of uncorrupted messages to decode and recover the entire file sent by the source. However, our solution provides the destinations with the ability to filter out corrupted messages and to have them filtered out by intermediate nodes as well.
Our scheme here aims for unconditional security. We rely on information-theoretic strength rather than on problems that are thought to be hard as in [4] , [12] , [22] , and [24] . Unconditional authentication codes have led to the development of multireceiver authentication codes [8] , [19] that could be relevant in the context of network coding. Multireceiver authentication codes allow any one of the receivers (in the context of network coding, that may be intermediate nodes and destinations) to verify the integrity and origin of a received message but require the source to be designated. Our scheme is inspired from the multireceiver authentication code proposed in [19] for receivers, which is robust against a coalition of malicious receivers, , and in which every key can be used to authenticate up to messages. We define and adapt the use of multireceiver authentication codes to network coding so that intermediate nodes can detect malicious packets without having to decode.
Our scheme is adaptive to the specifications of the application in use and the network setting. Its efficiency is scenario-dependent. The communication and computational costs are functions of parameters related to the application in use (i.e., the number of messages to be authenticated under the same key and the length of the messages) and to the network setting (i.e., the number of colluded malicious adversaries to be considered). A throughput analysis shows that tolerating inside adversaries comes at a high cost in terms of throughput (which is inversely proportional to the number of insider attackers that can collude.)
Apart from our scheme being unconditionally secure, other differences with existing schemes [4] , [12] , [22] , [24] are that: 1) it requires one single symbol only for tracking purposes; and 2) it works for live transmissions and is able to be tailored to send multiple files if needed. Indeed, [12] provides a pretransmission of hash values of encoded data that does not work for live transmission, while [4] , [5] , and [24] provide a solution with one key per file to be verified.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly present the network coding model we consider and define what are authentication codes in general and in particular for network coding. Section III presents the authentication scheme, whose analysis is presented in Section IV for security. Section V discusses how our scheme can be used for content and file distribution over an IP-based network and contains a goodput analysis to assess the impact of the scheme on throughput. Future work is addressed in the conclusion.
II. NETWORK CODING SETTING FOR AUTHENTICATION CODES
We start by introducing the multicast network coding model we are considering. Since we are not aware of prior work on authentication codes for network coding, we then propose a definition of authentication codes for multicast network coding.
A. Multicast Network Coding Model
The model of network we consider is an acyclic graph having unit capacity edges with a single source , which wants to send a set of messages to destinations . Messages are seen as sequences of elements of a finite field with elements, denoted by . Each edge of the graph carries a symbol at a time. For a node of the graph, the symbols on its outgoing edges are linear combinations, called local encoding, of the symbols entering the node through its incoming edges. If are the symbols to be sent by the source at a time, we have by induction that on any edge is actually a linear combination of the source symbols, that is , where the coefficients describe the coding operation. The vector is thus called the global encoding vector along the edge . We can describe the messages received by a node in the network with incoming edges by the following matrix equation:
where is called a transfer matrix. In particular, the destination nodes , can recover the source symbols , assuming that their respective transfer matrix has rank (this also means ). In this paper, we are not concerned about the existence of global encoding vectors, and we thus assume that we deal with a network for which suitable linear encoding vectors exist so that destination nodes are able to decode the received packets correctly.
We can packetize the symbols flowing on each edge into vectors , and likewise, the source symbols can be grouped as , so the equation at a node with incoming edges can be rewritten as
, where are the messages of length to be sent by the source.
B. Authentication Codes for Network Coding
Since we are not aware of prior work on network coding authentication codes, let us start by recalling the setting for classical authentication schemes, as proposed by Desmedt et al. [8] .
In [8] , the authors proposed a model for unconditionally secure authentication where one transmitter communicates to multiple receivers who cannot all be trusted. In this scenario, the transmitter first appends a tag to a common message that is then broadcast to all the receivers, who can separately verify the authenticity of the tagged message using their own private secret key. Among the receivers, there is a group of malicious receivers who use their secret key and all the previous messages to construct fake messages. A multireceiver authentication system refers to a scheme where receivers are present, among which at most can cheat. The malicious nodes can perform either an impersonation attack, if they try to construct a valid tagged message without having seen any transmitted message before, or a substitution attack, if they first listen to at least one tagged message before trying to fake a tag in such a way that the receiver will accept the tagged message. Perfect protection is obtained if the best chance of success in the attack is , where is the size of tag space; namely, the attacker cannot do better than make a guess and randomly pick one tag.
In [19] , the scheme of Desmedt et al. [8] has been generalized to the case where the same key can be used to authenticate up to messages. The network coding scenario that we consider in this paper is a multicast setting, where one source wants to send a set of messages to destinations. In order to propose a definition of network coding authentication scheme, let us first understand the main differences with respect to the classical multireceiver scenario.
1) The source does not broadcast the same message on all its outgoing edges, but sends different linear combinations of the messages , which means that the key used by the source to sign the messages will be used more than once, actually at least as many times as there are outgoing edges from the source. 2) We are interested in a more general network scenario, where intermediate nodes play a role. In particular, it is relevant in the context of pollution attacks that not only destination nodes, but also intermediate nodes, may check the authenticity of the packets. We call such nodes in the network verifying nodes. This set may include part or all of the destination nodes . This makes a big difference in network coding since while the destination nodes do have a transfer matrix to recover the message sent, this is not the case of regular intermediate nodes, which must perform the authentication check without being able a priori to decode. Based on the above considerations, we propose the following definition for multicast network coding.
Definition 1: We call a network coding authentication code an authentication code for verifying nodes, which is unconditionally secure against either substitution or impersonation attacks done by a group of at most adversaries, possibly belonging to the verifying nodes, where the source can use the same key at most times.
III. AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
Recall that we have a single source , which wants to multicast messages to destinations . We will denote the set of messages by to refer to the actual data to be sent, while we keep the notation for the whole packets, including the authentication tag. Each message is of length , so that while each symbol belongs to , we can see the whole message as part of . We also assume a set of nodes that can verify the authentication. A priori, this set can include the destinations, but can also be larger. Typically, we will assume that in the context of pollution attacks.
We now present our network coding authentication scheme and discuss its efficiency. Security will be analyzed in Section IV.
A. Setup and Authentication Tag Generation
We propose the following authentication scheme.
• Key generation: A trusted authority randomly generates polynomials and chooses distinct values . These polynomials are of degree , and we denote them by
• Key distribution: The trusted authority gives as private key to the source the polynomials , and as private key for each verifier the polynomials evaluated at , namely
. The values are made public. The keys can be given to the nodes when they sign up for a service protected by this scheme.
• Authentication tag: Let us assume that the source wants to send data messages . The source computes the following polynomial in :
which forms the authentication tag of each . The packets to be actually sent by the source are of the form The tag is attached after the message, and one symbol in is added at the beginning, which will be used to keep track of the network coding coefficients. The number of polynomials is related to the number of usages of the key, while the degree corresponds to the size of attackers coalition.
Note that while making the values public still may help an attacker, we prefer to make them public and prove that this actually does not help the attacker in order to minimize the amount of secret information given to the nodes.
B. Verification and Correctness of the Authentication Tag
In order to discuss the authentication check, let us recall from (1) Recall that a verifying node further has a private key . For each incoming edge , the node can thus compute the product of the received data on the th edge by the private keys, as follows:
and similarly for the key The node accepts a packet on its incoming edge if the two computations coincide, which we have just shown they do if there is no alteration of the protocol. Note that the verifying node does not need to decode the message (which it may not be able to do) in order to perform the check.
C. Parameters and Efficiency
We discuss the efficiency of the proposed scheme based on the communication, computation, and storage costs. The different parameters involved are summarized in Table I .
There are two classes of parameters: those fixed by the network, namely the number of destination nodes, the network code alphabet , the length of the data packets, and the number of messages to be sent by the source; we then have the security parameters and , which first depend on the following network parameters.
• Constraints on : We will typically take , which means that more nodes than just the destinations will check the authentication tags. We could imagine if we do not even want all the destinations to check the authentication of their packets. However, our goal is to have enough nodes in the network (though not necessarily all of them) verifying the integrity of the packets to avoid the propagation of polluted packets. We further have since private verification keys are obtained by evaluating the polynomials in . If , then we are forced to use some values of more than once, and the private keys are not unique anymore. Thus, . • Constraints on : We assume that is at least greater than to be able to protect with the same key all the messages to be sent within one encoding round. The scheme communication cost mainly relies on the size of the authentication tag , which is , since the length of the tag is , and we also have to consider the augmentation of the data vectors by one symbol element performed at the source. The computational costs involve computing and appending the tag at the source and verifying the tag at some intermediate nodes and at the destinations.
• Cost at the source: For creating a tag based on a message , recall that the source computes the following polynomial in :
which involves thus exponentiations in to compute , and then multiplications in to get . This is repeated for each of the messages . • Cost at the verifying nodes: A verifying node needs to do two things to check the tag. First, it computes which takes exponentiations in and multiplications in , before evaluating the polynomial arrived on its incoming edge in the public key . Since the polynomial is of degree , its evaluation requires exponentiations in for , and multiplications in to multiply each , with the coefficients of the polynomial. This is done for each of the incoming edges. Finally, the storage cost consists of the size of the keys, that is keys of size for the source, and the polynomials evaluated in one value of , yielding values in for each of the verifying nodes.
All the costs of the proposed scheme are summarized in Table II .
D. Key Distribution
In the proposed scheme as in the scheme of [8] , the trusted authority is used in an initialization phase to compute and distribute the keying material to the source, the destinations, and a number of intermediate nodes in the network. The trusted authority in the proposed scheme could be implemented as a "key distribution server" that sends the keying material over secure channels to the source and the verifiers. A secure channel would have to be mutually authenticated, integrity-protected, and encrypted. A simple implementation could be to have the trusted authority share a secret key with each entity involved that would allow the trusted authority to authenticate a requesting entity as a source, or a verifier, and thus send the appropriate keying material in encrypted and integrity-protected form to the authenticated source or verifier. One could assume that the shared secret keys would be given securely to each entity when an entity signs up for a service that uses the proposed scheme.
If we did not assume a trusted authority for the key generation and key distribution, then we would have designed a different scheme, i.e., a key exchange or key agreement scheme. That is not the goal of this paper.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
Threats are coming from either outside or inside opponents, who can attempt either impersonation or substitution attacks. Outside opponents are assumed to be able to see the data on the incoming edges of some intermediate nodes that they can monitor. Inside opponents, of course, see the messages transiting through them, but the difference is that some of them may actually be verifying nodes, and thus they can use their own private keys to forge a substitution attack. The analysis focuses on the worst-case scenario, namely a coalition of inside malicious nodes in possession of private keys is trying to make a substitution attack, that is, to send a fake packet after observing tagged messages in such a way that a node that checks for authentication will actually accept the faked authentication tag.
A. Preliminaries
In the following, we may write the dimension of the matrices as matrix indices for clarity.
Suppose that a malicious node has incoming edges, with received vector given componentwise by 
where all coefficients are in . Note that the matrix is of size and there are unknowns.
We now take into account that some of the nodes who are given the private keys to check the authentication could be corrupted. Since we assume a group of malicious nodes, let us furthermore assume the worst case, namely that all of them actually possess a private key . Since the values are made public, the group of adversaries can actually build another system of linear equations that exploits their knowledge of the private keys, namely contains the public key values, as before the unknowns are the coefficients of the private key to be found by the group of attackers.
Since the polynomials have degree , it is clear that can be at most , otherwise from the knowledge of only the private and public keys, the group of attackers can recover the source's private key, i.e., they can solve the system of equations and recover .
By putting together the information given by the private keys (4) and the one gathered from all the received vectors (3), the group of adversaries now has the knowledge of the following linear systems of equations for trying to find the source private key:
where is the aggregated number of incoming edges for all corrupted nodes and .
B. Main Analysis
We are now ready to state the security of the proposed authentication scheme. First, we see what are the conditions to prevent the adversaries to find the secret keys.
Lemma 1: If and , there exist vectors with coefficients in such that
Proof: The conditions may look obvious if one looks at both systems separately:
prevents to solve the second system, as does for the first. However, the adversaries know both; that is, they can form a system of the form with a priori, in the worst case equations for unknowns. Now recall that . . .
where each is a matrix containing blocks that are all different multiples of the -dimensional identity. Since . . .
contains copies of the
Vandermonde matrix , we can perform row operations on each using , and since is of rank , it is not hard to see that actually within each rows can be canceled out (they are linearly dependent). Thus, for a given , out of the set equations are redundant, and the coalition of adversaries actually has equations, for unknowns. Therefore or equivalently
In this case, there is at least one degree of freedom in solving the linear system of equations for finding the keys, and thus at least solutions (depending on the network coefficients, more dependency could appear, or this could be done by choosing ). Proposition 1: Consider a multicast network implementing linear network coding, among which nodes of them are verifying nodes owning a private key for authentication. The above scheme is a unconditionally secure network coding authentication code against a coalition of up to adversaries, possibly among the verifying nodes, in which every key can be used to authenticate up to messages, under the assumption that , where is the sum of the incoming edges at each adversary. 1 Proof: To make a substitution attack, the malicious verifying nodes want to generate a message such that it is accepted as authentic by any honest verifying node that they are trying to cheat. However, for that, they need to guess its secret key and choose a polynomial such that for some fake message . Gathering all they know after watching one transmission of tagged messages, the coalition of adversaries gets the following system of equations:
and Lemma 1 tells us that there are choices of that are solutions and thus possible secret keys. Thus, there are different -tuple of polynomials likely to be the source's private key, from which that there are equally likely private keys for . Finally, note that the receiver will accept the message if the check performed is successful. Now the check consists in evaluating the polynomial in two different ways, which induces a linear equation in the secret keys, which can be added to the above system. We now increase the rank of the system, so that with this extra constraint, the vector is uniquely identified, showing that no two choices of keys can give the same check. Therefore the probability of the receivers to succeed in a substitution attack is .
, there is no corrupted verifying node, and the condition is enough to guarantee security when the incoming edges of are monitored, with .
V. APPLICATION TO FILE DISTRIBUTION OVER AN IP-BASED NETWORK: PERFORMANCE AND PARAMETERS
In this section, we present how the proposed authentication scheme could be applied to content or file distribution over an IP-based network. We first discuss the parameters and that relate to the network over which a file is to be sent or distributed and their impact on the throughput and goodput. Then, we discuss how to derive the parameter depending on the size of the file to be sent. 
A. Throughput and Goodput
The throughput here is defined as the rate of noncorrupted messages. The goodput is defined as the rate of the useful information received, i.e., excluding the overhead introduced by the proposed scheme. The proposed scheme augments a packet of size sent from the source by one symbol and an authentication tag of size . The impact of the authentication tag size is so significant that it is not necessary to include the one symbol for decoding purposes in the goodput characterization. Thus, we have It is worth repeating here that the scenario with a coalition of insiders-which are supposed to guard the network against pollution attacks, but actually get corrupted and start attacking themselves-is a strong adversary model, and the above goodput computation illustrates the price to pay in this case, namely the denominator increases linearly in the number of corrupted verifying nodes. One could use the scheme with the assumption that the verifying nodes are honest.
B. Toy Example
We consider an exemplary topology with nodes, as shown in Fig. 1 . We chose a topology that has been used widely in the literature and is known as the butterfly network.
The number of verifiers in the network is of course related to the number of nodes in the network, ; from Section III-C, we have , where is the number of destinations. Not necessarily all nodes in the network need to be verifiers. Depending on the network size and topology, the number of verifiers in the network has an impact on the network throughput: the more verifiers, the higher the chance of canceling a pollution attack early in its propagation, and thus the higher throughput.
The parameter is related to the number of corrupted verifiers that collude to attack a victim verifier, namely of them. As one of the verifiers has to be the targeted victim node, . Note that the parameter infers on the source private key sizes and the tag size.
Let us consider as an example the network of Fig. 1 , which is a network of nodes comprising one source, two destinations, and four intermediate nodes. The number of verifiers is to be chosen within the following range:
. For a minimum value of , both destinations and one intermediate node can verify the messages' tags. The scheme has to be robust against , which is at most attackers (as one of the verifiers has to be the targeted victim node), thus one has to derive a network coding authentication code. With a authentication code, the throughput can be degraded by the pollution attack that may take place at the three nonverifier nodes. The degradation rate on the throughput due to the pollution depends on where the corrupted nonverifier nodes are in the network and on the retransmission strategies established at the source. The goodput would, however, represent 1/4 of the throughput.
With a maximum value of , both destinations and all four intermediate nodes can verify the messages' tags. The scheme has to be robust against attackers, which is at most attackers, thus one has to derive a network coding authentication code. With a authentication code, the throughput is not degraded by the pollution attack as all the nodes in the network can verify the integrity of messages and discard malicious packets. The corrupted messages are discarded at their entrance in the network, and therefore do not propagate in the network toward the destinations. However, the goodput would suffer and be only 1/7 of the throughput.
C. Scheme Parameters for File Distribution Over an IP-Based Network
For content distribution over an IP-based network with our scheme, at most messages forming the file to be distributed can be transmitted by the source through the network in an authenticated way using the same key. For our scheme to be secure against a coalition of receivers, we recall the following rules.
• , where is the number of messages to be sent by the source. • , where is the maximum number of incoming edges in a coalition of malicious nodes. One could decide to append one tag per IP packet, or to gather IP packets as one message, authenticated by one tag. In a practical scenario, the following should be considered. • A message consists of symbols , with a symbol being a bit, that is • One message authenticated by one tag consists of IP packets, . • IP packets are 1500 B long (12 000 b) with a payload of 1480 B. • The message length can be expressed in bits and in bytes.
We refer to as the message length expressed in bits and to as the message length expressed in bytes 
For
, we have , which means that the source can use the same key to tag at most messages of length b (carried over IP packets that are 12 000 b long).
Destinations can download a file with at most the following size in bytes (including headers):
B. The destinations can use the same key to authenticate a file download of at most MB when one tagged message is carried over IP packets.
A receiver node can have at most incoming edges, and the source can send messages. The scenarios in Table III show what are the parameters involved to allow the distribution of a given file to be authenticated under the same key.
For distributing a file that is 18 MB, it is sufficient for the source to tag each IP packet of 1500 B. The source then sends 12 000 messages tagged that form the 18-MB file. Any destination can verify with the same key each tag attached to the 12 000 messages.
For distributing a file that is 1.8 GB, the source generates tagged messages of size 15 kB. Each message is sent in a generation of 10 IP packets. The source sends 120 K messages tagged that form the file. At the destination, the same key can be used to verify the tags of the 120 K messages received.
For random linear network coding to work appropriately with the proposed scheme, the encoding should follow the tagging pace. Linear network coding can be performed on each IP packet generated at the source if each IP packet is appended with a tag and augmented by one symbol added in the beginning of the packet. If the same key is used to append tags to the IP packets, then the source can only send a file of 18 MB. However, if the source wants to send a file of MB (with ) protected using the same key, then the linear network coding has to be performed on each group of IP packets.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an unconditionally secure authentication scheme that provides multicast linear network coding with message integrity protection and source authentication. It offers protection in particular against pollution attacks since chosen intermediate nodes are actually able to verify the authentication tags of the packets received, despite being unable to decode the data, and thus to detect and discard the malicious packets that fail the verification. The scheme is robust against outsiders and up to powerful insiders, namely those who can verify the integrity and instead use their knowledge to attack the network.
The performance analysis showed that our scheme has a significant communication cost that results in a goodput that is th of the throughput, a high price to pay to tolerate inside attackers. Our solution allows the source to generate authentication tags for up to messages with the same key and can thus be used to authenticate a file download of at most MB when one tagged message is carried over IP packets.
We would like to conclude by emphasizing again that the need for multiple usages of the key, together with the property of authentication on packets that are not decoded, are challenges particular to network coding authentication.
Future work will involve optimization of the parameters involved in the authentication scheme for a more efficient solution. Another aspect to consider in the future is to offer more flexibility over the sender, as the scheme proposed here requires the sender to be designated.
